10 replies to this topic

[Numpty]

Is a Taser a prohibited firearm or is it "only" an offensive weapon?

I.e. is it an offence to own one?

[Will89]

I'd say Firearm:
A person commits an offence if, without the authority of the Defence Council [F8or the Scottish Ministers (by virtue of provision made under section 63 of the Scotland Act 1998)], he has in his possession, or purchases or acquires, or manufactures, sells or transfers— ....

any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing; and

Will

Edit: making bold the part I think applies

Edited by Will89, 28 February 2012 - 08:29 PM.

[Machiavelli]

Firearms Act 1968 as elaborated upon by the CPS:

Section 5(1)(b) any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid gas or other thing. Generally stun guns or electric shock devices, CS gas not usually cattle prods but depends on type. Note: Parliament has provided that disguised weapons fall within the provisions for a minimum sentence and so, an offence contrary to section 5(1A) should be charged rather than an offence contrary to seciton 5(1)(b) where a stun gun is disguised as another object and also meets the requirements of section 5(A1), (R v Brereton [2012]EWCA Crim 85) ;

EDIT: Ninja'd lol

I'd say Firearm:
A person commits an offence if, without the authority of the Defence Council [F8or the Scottish Ministers (by virtue of provision made under section 63 of the Scotland Act 1998)], he has in his possession, or purchases or acquires, or manufactures, sells or transfers— ....

any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing; and

Will

Edited by Machiavelli, 28 February 2012 - 08:32 PM.

[enzoxk]

Tasers are considered to be "prohibited weapons" under the Firearms Act 1968 and possession is an offence. The maximum sentence for possession is ten years in prison and an unlimited fine.

Edited by enzoxk, 28 February 2012 - 08:33 PM.

[maka]

just a thought:

any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing; and

a scenario city like thing here. Let's say you had a 'Super Soaker' water gun. and filled it say with dilute CS. would it then for the purpose of law become a firearm?
(or even say if you filled perhaps a washing up liquid bottle or a pipette?)

[Will89]

just a thought:

a scenario city like thing here. Let's say you had a 'Super Soaker' water gun. and filled it say with dilute CS. would it then for the purpose of law become a firearm?
(or even say if you filled perhaps a washing up liquid bottle or a pipette?)

In that scenario yes as it has been adapted to discharge noxious liquid or other thing

Will

[maka]

Thought so. Just worth a fictional and pondering passing thought.
as i was thinking almost certainly with the water pistol. but the squeeze bottle its more a 'possession' that really discharging

[Numpty]

Interesting, cheers.

[SkinSte]

In that scenario yes as it has been adapted to discharge noxious liquid or other thing

Will

That is incorrect. The item itself (water pistol or squeezy bottle) has not been physically altered or adapted. There is case law showing that simply filling an article with a substance (I think the case law was acid) does not make it an adapted offensive weapon; it can only be an intended one.

Criminal Law; R v Upton; R v Formosa
COURT OF APPEAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION
LLOYD LJ, MCCULLOUGH AND PHILLIPS JJ

17 JULY 1990
Firearms – Possession – Prohibited weapons – Weapon designed or adapted for discharge of noxious liquid etc – Designed or adapted – Washing-up liquid bottle filled with hydrochloric acid – Whether 'designed or adapted' for discharge of noxious liquid – Whether prohibited weapon – Firearms Act 1968, s 5(1)(b).

The appellants were arrested in possession of a washing-up liquid bottle filled with 400 ml of hydrochloric acid. They were charged with and convicted of possessing a prohibited weapon, contrary to s 5(1)(b)a of the Firearms Act 1968. They appealed against their conviction on the ground that the washing-up liquid bottle had not been 'designed or adapted' for the discharge of a noxious liquid and therefore was not a prohibited weapon within s 5 of the 1968 Act. The Crown contended that the term 'designed' meant 'intended' and that the washing-up liquid bottle had been intended to be used by the appellants to discharge the acid and had been 'adapted' for that purpose when it was filled with the acid.
a Section 5(1) is set out at p 132 c d, post
Held – The term 'adapted' in s 5 of the 1968 Act took its colour and meaning from the context in which it was used, and in conjunction with the term 'designed' it imported some physical alteration to the object in question to make it fit for the use in question. Since the washing-up liquid bottle had not been altered when it was filled with the acid it had not been 'designed or adapted' for the discharge of a noxious liquid within s 5 of the 1968 Act and was not a prohibited weapon. The appeal would accordingly be allowed.

Appeals against conviction
John Formosa and Anthony William Upton appealed against their convictions on 25 October 1989 in the Crown Court at Knightsbridge before Judge Hordern QC
[1991] 1 All ER 131 at 132
and a jury of possessing a prohibited weapon contrary to s 5(1)(b) of the Firearms Act 1968, for which they were each sentenced to three years' imprisonment. They were also convicted of having an offensive weapon, for which they were sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment concurrent. The facts are set out in the judgment of the court.

Paul Higham for the appellants.
Bernard Eaton (who did not appear below) for the Crown.
17 July 1990. The following judgment was delivered.

LLOYD LJ
(Reading the judgment of the Court). In this appeal we are concerned with the meaning of s 5(1) of the Firearms Act 1968. That section provides:
'A person commits an offence if, without the authority of the Defence Council, he has in his possession, or purchases or acquires, or manufactures, sells or transfers—(a) any firearm which is so designed or adapted that, if pressure is applied to the trigger, missiles continue to be discharged until pressure is removed from the trigger or the magazine containing the missiles is empty (b) any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing and © any ammunition containing, or designed or adapted to contain, any such noxious thing.'
On 25 October 1989 in the Crown Court at Knightsbridge these two appellants were convicted of possessing a prohibited weapon contrary to s 5 of the 1968 Act and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. That was count 2 of the indictment. On count 3 they were convicted of having an offensive weapon, on which they were sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment concurrent. We need not trouble with the remaining counts of the indictment, save to observe that they were acquitted on count 1, conspiracy to rob.
Their applications for leave to appeal against conviction were referred to the full court by the registrar since the question involved is a point of law. The appeal is confined to their conviction on count 2.
The facts were that on 2 February 1989 police officers on mobile patrol noticed the appellants sitting in a red Ford Sierra motor car parked at the kerb of a West London street. In the view of the police officers they were behaving suspiciously. So the police officers reversed their vehicle alongside that of the appellants and went over to speak to them. Both appellants were wearing gloves and both had caps. Upton when asked said that the car was his. There was a machete lying on the floor beneath Formosa's feet. That was the subject of count 3 on which both appellants were convicted. Upton was discovered to have in his inside jacket pocket a washing-up liquid bottle containing 400 ml of hydrochloric acid. That was the subject of count 2.
The appellants were arrested and in due course the case came on for trial.
It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that there was no evidence that the washing-up liquid bottle was a weapon designed or adapted for the discharge of noxious liquid. The mere fact that the bottle had been filled with hydrochloric acid rather than washing-up liquid did not mean it had been designed or adapted to discharge the acid.

The judge was not referred to any authority on the construction of s 5 of the 1968 Act. He ruled that, if the contents of the object were changed, then the object itself had been adapted and therefore he allowed the case to go before the jury.
Counsel for the appellants argues that the judge's ruling was erroneous. He submits that an empty washing-up liquid bottle is not a weapon in any sense of the word. There can be no dispute about the correctness of that submission. He goes on to submit that, even if it becomes a weapon when filled with hydrochloric acid, it does not become a prohibited weapon within the meaning of s 5(1)(b) of the 1968 Act, since it cannot be said that the bottle has been 'designed or adapted' to discharge the hydrochloric acid. It was neither more nor less than a bottle containing hydrochloric acid. The appellants were therefore charged with the wrong offence. They should have been charged with an offence under s 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 with carrying an offensive weapon. For 'offensive weapon' is defined by s 1(4) as including any article intended by the person having it with him for use for causing injury to the person. There is no equivalent definition in s 5 of the 1968 Act.
In support of his submission counsel referred us to three authorities: first, a ruling of Judge Price QC in the Central Criminal Court in R v Titus [1971] Crim LR 279; second, the decision of the Divisional Court presided over by Lord Parker CJ in Maddox v Storer [1962] 1 All ER 831, [1963] 1 QB 451; and, finally, the decision of Mr David Widdicombe QC in Backer v Secretary of State for the Environment [1983] 2 All ER 1021, [1983] 1 WLR 1485. From these authorities there emerges this proposition, that the word 'adapted' takes its colour and meaning from the context in which it appears. Where it is used on its own, it may bear a wide meaning. Thus in Maddox v Storer it was held that in Sch 1 to the Road Traffic Act 1960 it meant simply apt or fit for the purpose in question. That meaning corresponds to the first of the two meanings contained in the Oxford English Dictionary. But where the word is used in conjunction with the word 'constructed' in the phrase 'constructed or adapted' it bears a narrower meaning. It imports then some physical alteration to the thing in question. This corresponds to the second of the two meanings in the Oxford English Dictionary. That was the meaning given to the word in French v Champkin [1920] 1 KB 76 and in Taylor v Mead [1961] 1 All ER 626, [1961] 1 WLR 435. In the former case Lord Reading CJ said (at 79):
'The justices seem to have treated the word “adapted” as if it were synonymous with “suitable” or “apt” whereas it must be construed as meaning altered so as to make the vehicle apt for the conveyance of goods.'

Here the word 'adapted' is used in conjunction with the word 'designed'. On which side of the line does the present case come? We have no doubt that it comes on the same side of the line as French v Champkin.
It was argued by counsel for the Crown that 'designed' meant no more than 'intended', and since the bottle when filled with hydrochloric acid was clearly intended to be used by the appellants for discharging the acid it became a weapon designed for that purpose.
We cannot accept that argument. If the word 'designed' were to bear that meaning it would fit most uneasily with the word 'adapted' in the composite phrase 'designed or adapted'. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the section is dealing with prohibited weapons, the mere possession of which constitutes an offence. One would expect, therefore, that the commission of the offence would be capable of objective verification. The offence under s 5(1)(a) clearly does not depend on the intention of the user. We would say the same of the offence under s 5(1)(b).
We conclude, therefore, that the word 'adapted' in s 5(1)(b) must bear the narrower of the two meanings in other words, it must mean that the object has been altered so as to make it fit for the use in question.
The case then comes down to this: was the empty washing-up liquid bottle altered when it was filled with hydrochloric acid? The answer in our view is clearly No. There was no physical alteration to the bottle. The bottle remained the same. The addition of the acid did not change the bottle in any way. It follows that the bottle with the acid was not a weapon 'designed or adapted' for the discharge of acid within the meaning of the section.
The consequence of the alternative view would indeed be alarming, as was pointed out in the course of argument. It would mean that a householder who filled a milk bottle with acid in order to destroy a wasps' nest would be in possession of a weapon adapted for the discharge of a noxious liquid and would therefore be guilty of the offence of possessing a prohibited weapon; until, of course, he had used the acid for the purpose in question when the milk bottle would revert to its pristine innocence. That could not be right. It shows that the possession of the washing-up liquid bottle by these two appellants was not the sort of case to which s 5 is directed. They could, and should, have been charged with an offence under s 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953.
It follows, in our view, that the ruling of Judge Price in R v Titus [1971] Crim LR 279, which is the only case directly in point, was correct. In that case the judge held that a water pistol filled with ammonia was not a weapon designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid and was therefore capable of being an imitation firearm under s 57(4) of the 1968 Act. We agree.
For the reasons given the convictions on count 2 of this indictment must be quashed. But the convictions on the other counts will stand. The effect is that the sentence overall will be reduced from three years to 18 months.
Solicitors: Registrar of Criminal Appeals; Crown Prosecution Service, Kensington.
Appeal allowed. Conviction on count 2 quashed.
Kate O'Hanlon Barrister

[adslegend]

That is incorrect. The item itself (water pistol or squeezy bottle) has not been physically altered or adapted. There is case law showing that simply filling an article with a substance (I think the case law was acid) does not make it an adapted offensive weapon; it can only be an intended one.

Criminal Law; R v Upton; R v Formosa
COURT OF APPEAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION
LLOYD LJ, MCCULLOUGH AND PHILLIPS JJ

17 JULY 1990
Firearms – Possession – Prohibited weapons – Weapon designed or adapted for discharge of noxious liquid etc – Designed or adapted – Washing-up liquid bottle filled with hydrochloric acid – Whether 'designed or adapted' for discharge of noxious liquid – Whether prohibited weapon – Firearms Act 1968, s 5(1)(b).

The appellants were arrested in possession of a washing-up liquid bottle filled with 400 ml of hydrochloric acid. They were charged with and convicted of possessing a prohibited weapon, contrary to s 5(1)(b)a of the Firearms Act 1968. They appealed against their conviction on the ground that the washing-up liquid bottle had not been 'designed or adapted' for the discharge of a noxious liquid and therefore was not a prohibited weapon within s 5 of the 1968 Act. The Crown contended that the term 'designed' meant 'intended' and that the washing-up liquid bottle had been intended to be used by the appellants to discharge the acid and had been 'adapted' for that purpose when it was filled with the acid.
a Section 5(1) is set out at p 132 c d, post
Held – The term 'adapted' in s 5 of the 1968 Act took its colour and meaning from the context in which it was used, and in conjunction with the term 'designed' it imported some physical alteration to the object in question to make it fit for the use in question. Since the washing-up liquid bottle had not been altered when it was filled with the acid it had not been 'designed or adapted' for the discharge of a noxious liquid within s 5 of the 1968 Act and was not a prohibited weapon. The appeal would accordingly be allowed.

Appeals against conviction
John Formosa and Anthony William Upton appealed against their convictions on 25 October 1989 in the Crown Court at Knightsbridge before Judge Hordern QC
[1991] 1 All ER 131 at 132
and a jury of possessing a prohibited weapon contrary to s 5(1)(b) of the Firearms Act 1968, for which they were each sentenced to three years' imprisonment. They were also convicted of having an offensive weapon, for which they were sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment concurrent. The facts are set out in the judgment of the court.

Paul Higham for the appellants.
Bernard Eaton (who did not appear below) for the Crown.
17 July 1990. The following judgment was delivered.

LLOYD LJ
(Reading the judgment of the Court). In this appeal we are concerned with the meaning of s 5(1) of the Firearms Act 1968. That section provides:
'A person commits an offence if, without the authority of the Defence Council, he has in his possession, or purchases or acquires, or manufactures, sells or transfers—(a) any firearm which is so designed or adapted that, if pressure is applied to the trigger, missiles continue to be discharged until pressure is removed from the trigger or the magazine containing the missiles is empty (b) any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing and © any ammunition containing, or designed or adapted to contain, any such noxious thing.'
On 25 October 1989 in the Crown Court at Knightsbridge these two appellants were convicted of possessing a prohibited weapon contrary to s 5 of the 1968 Act and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. That was count 2 of the indictment. On count 3 they were convicted of having an offensive weapon, on which they were sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment concurrent. We need not trouble with the remaining counts of the indictment, save to observe that they were acquitted on count 1, conspiracy to rob.
Their applications for leave to appeal against conviction were referred to the full court by the registrar since the question involved is a point of law. The appeal is confined to their conviction on count 2.
The facts were that on 2 February 1989 police officers on mobile patrol noticed the appellants sitting in a red Ford Sierra motor car parked at the kerb of a West London street. In the view of the police officers they were behaving suspiciously. So the police officers reversed their vehicle alongside that of the appellants and went over to speak to them. Both appellants were wearing gloves and both had caps. Upton when asked said that the car was his. There was a machete lying on the floor beneath Formosa's feet. That was the subject of count 3 on which both appellants were convicted. Upton was discovered to have in his inside jacket pocket a washing-up liquid bottle containing 400 ml of hydrochloric acid. That was the subject of count 2.
The appellants were arrested and in due course the case came on for trial.
It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that there was no evidence that the washing-up liquid bottle was a weapon designed or adapted for the discharge of noxious liquid. The mere fact that the bottle had been filled with hydrochloric acid rather than washing-up liquid did not mean it had been designed or adapted to discharge the acid.

The judge was not referred to any authority on the construction of s 5 of the 1968 Act. He ruled that, if the contents of the object were changed, then the object itself had been adapted and therefore he allowed the case to go before the jury.
Counsel for the appellants argues that the judge's ruling was erroneous. He submits that an empty washing-up liquid bottle is not a weapon in any sense of the word. There can be no dispute about the correctness of that submission. He goes on to submit that, even if it becomes a weapon when filled with hydrochloric acid, it does not become a prohibited weapon within the meaning of s 5(1)(b) of the 1968 Act, since it cannot be said that the bottle has been 'designed or adapted' to discharge the hydrochloric acid. It was neither more nor less than a bottle containing hydrochloric acid. The appellants were therefore charged with the wrong offence. They should have been charged with an offence under s 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 with carrying an offensive weapon. For 'offensive weapon' is defined by s 1(4) as including any article intended by the person having it with him for use for causing injury to the person. There is no equivalent definition in s 5 of the 1968 Act.
In support of his submission counsel referred us to three authorities: first, a ruling of Judge Price QC in the Central Criminal Court in R v Titus [1971] Crim LR 279; second, the decision of the Divisional Court presided over by Lord Parker CJ in Maddox v Storer [1962] 1 All ER 831, [1963] 1 QB 451; and, finally, the decision of Mr David Widdicombe QC in Backer v Secretary of State for the Environment [1983] 2 All ER 1021, [1983] 1 WLR 1485. From these authorities there emerges this proposition, that the word 'adapted' takes its colour and meaning from the context in which it appears. Where it is used on its own, it may bear a wide meaning. Thus in Maddox v Storer it was held that in Sch 1 to the Road Traffic Act 1960 it meant simply apt or fit for the purpose in question. That meaning corresponds to the first of the two meanings contained in the Oxford English Dictionary. But where the word is used in conjunction with the word 'constructed' in the phrase 'constructed or adapted' it bears a narrower meaning. It imports then some physical alteration to the thing in question. This corresponds to the second of the two meanings in the Oxford English Dictionary. That was the meaning given to the word in French v Champkin [1920] 1 KB 76 and in Taylor v Mead [1961] 1 All ER 626, [1961] 1 WLR 435. In the former case Lord Reading CJ said (at 79):
'The justices seem to have treated the word “adapted” as if it were synonymous with “suitable” or “apt” whereas it must be construed as meaning altered so as to make the vehicle apt for the conveyance of goods.'

Here the word 'adapted' is used in conjunction with the word 'designed'. On which side of the line does the present case come? We have no doubt that it comes on the same side of the line as French v Champkin.
It was argued by counsel for the Crown that 'designed' meant no more than 'intended', and since the bottle when filled with hydrochloric acid was clearly intended to be used by the appellants for discharging the acid it became a weapon designed for that purpose.
We cannot accept that argument. If the word 'designed' were to bear that meaning it would fit most uneasily with the word 'adapted' in the composite phrase 'designed or adapted'. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the section is dealing with prohibited weapons, the mere possession of which constitutes an offence. One would expect, therefore, that the commission of the offence would be capable of objective verification. The offence under s 5(1)(a) clearly does not depend on the intention of the user. We would say the same of the offence under s 5(1)(b).
We conclude, therefore, that the word 'adapted' in s 5(1)(b) must bear the narrower of the two meanings in other words, it must mean that the object has been altered so as to make it fit for the use in question.
The case then comes down to this: was the empty washing-up liquid bottle altered when it was filled with hydrochloric acid? The answer in our view is clearly No. There was no physical alteration to the bottle. The bottle remained the same. The addition of the acid did not change the bottle in any way. It follows that the bottle with the acid was not a weapon 'designed or adapted' for the discharge of acid within the meaning of the section.
The consequence of the alternative view would indeed be alarming, as was pointed out in the course of argument. It would mean that a householder who filled a milk bottle with acid in order to destroy a wasps' nest would be in possession of a weapon adapted for the discharge of a noxious liquid and would therefore be guilty of the offence of possessing a prohibited weapon; until, of course, he had used the acid for the purpose in question when the milk bottle would revert to its pristine innocence. That could not be right. It shows that the possession of the washing-up liquid bottle by these two appellants was not the sort of case to which s 5 is directed. They could, and should, have been charged with an offence under s 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953.
It follows, in our view, that the ruling of Judge Price in R v Titus [1971] Crim LR 279, which is the only case directly in point, was correct. In that case the judge held that a water pistol filled with ammonia was not a weapon designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid and was therefore capable of being an imitation firearm under s 57(4) of the 1968 Act. We agree.
For the reasons given the convictions on count 2 of this indictment must be quashed. But the convictions on the other counts will stand. The effect is that the sentence overall will be reduced from three years to 18 months.
Solicitors: Registrar of Criminal Appeals; Crown Prosecution Service, Kensington.
Appeal allowed. Conviction on count 2 quashed.
Kate O'Hanlon Barrister

I think it was actually ammonia, but +1

[SkinSte]

I thought it was some bleach but when I checked the case law it came up as acid :o